

# Two Step Graph-based Semi-supervised Learning for Online Auction Fraud Detection


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Phiradet Bangcharoensap<sup>1</sup>, Hayato Kobayashi<sup>2</sup>, Nobuyuki Shimizu<sup>2</sup>, Satoshi Yamauchi<sup>2</sup>, and Tsuyoshi Murata<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Tokyo Institute of Technology, <sup>2</sup>Yahoo Japan Corporation

## Definition of Fraudster

Auction users who participate in their own auction with other user IDs in order to drive up the final price.




## Overview

### Key Ideas

**U**niform interaction of innocents

**H**omophily

**Input**  
(product, seller, bidder)




**Objective:** Fraudsters working in the same collusion with blacklisted users are ranked at the top.

## Graph-base SSL

### Modified Adsorption (MAD) [1]

**Input:** partially labeled weighted undirected graph

**Output:** soft label matrix



**Node:** instance that want to classify

- A few labelled nodes, with confidence

**Edge:** similarity between instances

Assign a score indicating likelihood of being each label (soft labels)

Tradeoff between *fitting* and *smoothness* constraints

- **Fitting:** retain initial labels of seed nodes

- **Smoothness:** assign same labels to adjacent nodes

**H**

Solve the convex optimization problem


$$\min_{\hat{Y}} \sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} \left[ \underbrace{\mu_1 (\mathbf{Y}_l - \hat{\mathbf{Y}}_l)^\top \mathbf{S} (\mathbf{Y}_l - \hat{\mathbf{Y}}_l)}_{\text{Fitting}} + \underbrace{\mu_2 \hat{\mathbf{Y}}_l^\top \mathbf{L} \hat{\mathbf{Y}}_l}_{\text{Smoothness}} + \underbrace{\mu_3 \|\hat{\mathbf{Y}}_l - \mathbf{R}_l\|^2}_{\text{Regularization}} \right]$$

$\hat{\mathbf{Y}}$  where is a matrix storing score of each label,  $\mathbf{Y}$  stores seed information, and  $\mathbf{L}$  is the Laplacian matrix.

## Fraud Scoring

**Input**  
soft label matrix


**Output**  
fraud score of nodes



$$\varphi(v, \hat{\mathbf{Y}}) = \frac{\hat{\mathbf{Y}}_{v1}}{\sum_{l=1}^{m+1} \hat{\mathbf{Y}}_{vl}} \quad \text{MAD}$$

$$\rho(v, \hat{\mathbf{Y}}) = \varphi(v, \hat{\mathbf{Y}}) + \frac{\gamma}{|N(v)|} \sum_{u \in N(v)} \mathbf{W}_{uv} \varphi(u, \hat{\mathbf{Y}})$$


Weighted degree centrality (WDC)



Distribution of weighted degree centrality (WDC) of legitimate users and fraudsters. Fraudsters tend to have higher WDC.

## Experiment Setting

### Real-world Dataset



### Evaluation Metric

Higher NDCG is better.

The predicted ranking results were compared with the blacklisted users. We used normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG) [2] as the evaluation metric.

$$\text{NDCG} = \frac{\text{DCG}}{\text{IDCG}} \quad \text{DCG} = \sum_{i=1}^p \frac{2^{r(i)} - 1}{\log_2(i + 1)} \quad \text{IDCG} = \sum_{i=1}^{\min(p, |Q|)} \frac{1}{\log_2(i + 1)}$$


where  $p$  is the size of the result,  $r(i)$  is one if the  $i^{\text{th}}$  result is fraudulent, and  $|Q|$  is the number of testing fraudsters.

## Result

### Does the dummy label help?


Node type	with dummy		w/o dummy	
	<NDCG>	SD	<NDCG>	SD
All	<u>0.431</u>	0.015	0.406	0.019
Bidder	<u>0.423</u>	0.026	0.397	0.035
Seller	<u>0.336</u>	0.049	0.284	0.029
Mixed	<u>0.374</u>	0.044	0.319	0.024

### Comparison with unsupervised methods



- Compare with weighted degree centrality (WDC) and eigenvector centrality (Eigen. C.)  
- 2-STEP method outperforms MAD, WDC,

### Comparison with a Sybil defense method [3]



## References

- [1] Talukdar, P.P., Cramer, K.: New regularized algorithms for transductive learning. In: Proceedings of the European Conference on Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases: Part II. pp. 442–457. ECML PKDD '09, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg (2009)
- [2] Järvelin, K., Kekäläinen, J.: IR evaluation methods for retrieving highly relevant documents. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Annual International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information Retrieval. pp. 41–48. SIGIR'00, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2000)
- [3] Viswanath, B., Post, A., Gummadi, K.P., Mislove, A.: An analysis of social network-based sybil defenses. SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review. 40(4), 363–374 (2010)